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Maine’s Paradoxical Politics

Maine’s
Paradoxical
Politics
by Kenneth Palmer

Kenneth Palmer’s article, based on his 2009
University of Maine College of Liberal Arts and
Sciences Maine Heritage Lecture, discusses the paradoxes of Maine’s politics that often draw national
attention. He notes how these paradoxes have contributed to the state’s having a “creative and effective
political system.” Maine politics are dynamic in
nature, with parties loosely hung together, governors
winning by pluralities rather than majorities, and
significant turnover both in members and parties
in legislative districts. Palmer suggests that Maine’s
political leaders find themselves as centrists, primarily because they want to find practical solutions
to difficult problems.
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A

s Election Day 2009 neared some of us who teach
American government were approached by persons
in the national media asking us about various aspects
of Maine politics. Their questions concerned national
health care reform and the role of our two U.S. senators in that debate. On reflection, though, questions
about Maine politics from people outside of Maine
are really fairly common. The state presents a puzzle.
That is especially true for people who try to understand
Maine from the perspective of regarding a state as a
sort of microcosm of the national picture. That kind of
thinking is not a good place to start in understanding
Maine. Maine politics is, in fact, special and different.
Our state’s distinctiveness has been known for
most of its history. In his work entitled Inside U.S.A.,
written in the 1940s, John Gunther wrote that Maine’s
“chief distinction is…not size but character.” Among
its particular qualities, Gunther identified one as
“intrepidity”—a quality related to “the way people
make their living by combat with the elements”
(Gunther 1947: 485). Other special characteristics
were “simplicity, financial integrity, humor,” and a
strong sense of “state pride.” Gunther’s appraisal has
been echoed in subsequent years and in many other
sources. The current edition of The Almanac of
American Politics, for instance, identifies Maine as “a
state with a distinctive personality;” it uses adjectives
such as “ornery, contrary minded and rough-hewn” to
describe our citizens (Barone and Cohen 2009: 673).
Such broad-brush labeling—while colorful—
doesn’t add much insight in understanding Maine’s
politics. To go further, I believe we need to notice the
state’s political culture and the demographic features
that reinforce that culture. This article will try to sketch
those patterns and look at the political process that
flows from them. The paradoxes of our politics, the
eccentricities that sometimes draw national attention,
do fit together in some critical ways, and have helped
to make Maine a creative and effective political system.
Maine’s political culture—by the term culture I
mean the attitudes and expectations that citizens bring
to government—has been called the moralistic or
participatory culture. This comes from the work of
Daniel Elazar (1984) whose path-breaking book
American Federalism: A View from the States has
shaped the thinking of many of us who study state

The paradoxes of
politics. The moralistic culture
our politics, the
stresses the importance of
community and the obligation
eccentricities that
of citizens to take part in its
governance. Traditionally, much
sometimes draw
of New England has shared in
the moralistic culture. Its oldest
national attention…
and perhaps best institutional
expression is the New England
fit together in some
town meeting, an arrangement
where the citizens come together
critical ways, and
to decide on their town’s goals
and how to attain them. In the
have helped to
1830s, Alexis DeTocqueville, in
his classic study Democracy in
make Maine a
America, gave particular attention to the town meeting, which
creative and effective
he much admired. “It is in the
township,” DeTocqueville wrote,
political system.
“that the desire for esteem and
the taste for power are concentrated; these passions—so often
troublesome elements in
society—take on a different character when exercised so
close to home. With much care and skill power has
been broken into fragments in the township, so that
the maximum possible number of people have some
concern with public affairs” (DeTocqueville 2000: 35).
Maine’s devotion to this participatory culture has
influenced our politics in several respects. For one
thing, it has engendered a high level of citizen engagement. The state regularly ranks among the top tier of
states in voter turnout in national elections, a habit that
makes Maine an exception to many other high-turnout
states, where voting behavior is linked to above-average
levels of income and education in the population, characteristics less common in Maine. Another evidence of
the participatory culture is the unusual strength and
power of our state legislature. When Maine’s constitution-writers created certain executive offices such as
treasurer and secretary of state, they assigned the legislature, not the governor, to name those officials. Later
the attorney general would join the list. Maine is the
only state with such an arrangement.
In his writings, Daniel Elazar (1984) argued the
moralistic or participatory culture prevailed not only
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in New England, but also across most of the northern
part of the United States where New Englanders
migrated. That view is relevant because Maine, while
a New England state, bears some similarity to western
states in the way it was settled. Ours was a frontier
state in the early 19th century, a large area populated
in rapid fashion, although the movement here was eastward from the south and west. From 1800 to 1860,
the population increased fourfold, from about 150,000
to more than 600,000.

…state politics in Maine is unusually
dynamic, with parties that are loosely
hung together, with governors who win
by pluralities, not majorities, with legislatures that are marked by much turnover
among members and significant turnover
among the parties in individual districts.
That frontier quality seemed to intensify the
communitarian culture. Maine’s Constitution of 1819
was even more democratic than the Massachusetts
Constitution, under which we had been governed as a
District. Property and religious requirements for voting,
present in the Massachusetts charter, were mostly abolished in the Maine Constitution. Like some western
states, Maine has long shown a willingness to modify
government arrangements and processes, usually to
make them more accountable to its citizens. Popular
lawmaking, in the form of the initiative and the referendum, begun in South Dakota in 1898, and adopted
in Maine in 1911, has been one such means. Maine has
used the device more than 40 times since 1970. The 15
states that currently place limits on the terms of their
state legislators, including Maine, have generally done
so through a referendum. Maine adopted term limits
early in the process, in 1993. Significantly, it is the only
northeastern state presently to do so.
28 · Maine Policy Review · Winter/Spring 2010

Our habit of molding governmental structure
to citizen needs is also seen in the wide use of professionally trained town and city mangers for our localities. Most other states using the council/manager
model employ it for towns of more than 10,000
people. Because Maine has relatively few such localities, our communities have modified the system such
that a professional manager often works with a town
meeting or a board of selectmen, not necessarily an
elected council.
Another factor that strengthens the moralistic
culture is the spread-out nature of our population,
which is scattered among nearly 500 communities in
the state. Maine’s six largest towns and cities account
for only about 20 percent of the state’s population.
Research on state politics generally indicates that residents living in small towns show greater attention to
the workings of state government than do residents of
big cities. Urban residents sometimes find the affairs
of the state government obscured by the activities of
their city. A focus on the state government is important—it is a key element providing a shared sense of
political involvement among communities, even when
the distance between individual towns is large and
travel often difficult.
How do these cultural characteristics affect our
politics? The general answer is that they help keep
politics dynamic and close to home. Candidates for
public office must campaign diligently and thoroughly
across the state, visiting as many towns as possible and
meeting as many people individually as possible. That is
as true for statewide candidates running for governor or
national office as it is for candidates for local and state
legislative offices. In his book This Splendid Game:
Maine Campaigns and Elections, 1940–2002,
Christian Potholm quotes an observer of Edmund
Muskie’s 1954 gubernatorial campaign describing
Muskie as a candidate who acted “as if he were running
for selectman,” that is, carefully working his way
through each town and each neighborhood (Potholm
2003: 51). That localism infuses our politics regularly,
whatever the campaign season, the offices sought, or
the issues of greatest concern in that election.
The stress on grassroots campaigning has contributed to Maine having a large number of independent
voters, and undoubtedly, to our being the only state to
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have elected two independent governors in the past
35 years. The link between campaign style and political independence is likely found in our candidateoriented elections. The focus is on the personal qualifications, the capability of the candidate, less on the
candidate’s party and party allegiances. Party loyalties
still count in some districts, but their impact is generally less here than in most other states. The Maine
Clean Elections Act of 1996, which enables legislative
candidates to gain certain public financing, has
contributed toward a loosening of ties between candidates and parties. However, an independent streak
in Maine politics was evident long before that Act
was approved. In fact, I would argue a strain of independence began in campaigns even when we were a
solidly Republican stronghold.
In 1948 Margaret Chase Smith successfully challenged two opponents in the Republican primary for
the nomination for U.S. Senator—one an incumbent
governor and the other a former governor. She emphasized that as a sitting member of Congress, she had
qualifications deeper than theirs. Although both her
opponents had won statewide elections, neither had
served in Congress. In contrast, she had represented
Maine’s 2nd congressional district for eight years. In
1954, Neil Bishop, a veteran Republican politician,
headed a group called Republicans for Muskie, and
contributed to Muskie’s election to the governorship in
that year, which is often cited as the beginning of a twoparty system in Maine. Muskie undoubtedly helped to
place the Democratic Party in a competitive posture
with Republicans. Eight years after he left office, Maine
elected another Democrat, Kenneth Curtis, to the
governorship. Curtis served two terms from 1967 to
1975. Four years later, Maine again elected a Democrat,
Joseph Brennan, to the governorship, who also served
for two terms, from 1979 to 1987.
Still, it is worth noticing that the emergence of
independent candidates in gubernatorial races began
at about the same time Democrats began seriously
contesting statewide elections. The effect of the presence of independents has been to make it difficult for
either party to marshal an electoral majority behind its
gubernatorial candidate. In the 10 elections we have
held since 1970, the winning candidate for governor
obtained a majority of the vote on only three occasions.

In just two instances was the winner a candidate
running on a party label. Curtis won with just over
50 percent in 1970. The other two majority elections
were landslides for incumbent governors running for
re-election: Brennan in 1982 and Independent Angus
King in 1998. In the other seven contests, at least three
serious candidates competed in the race, and the winner
obtained less than 50 percent of the vote. Looking
toward 2010, about 20 candidates have so far entered
the field to succeed Governor Baldacci, making it very
likely the record of plurality winners will continue.
What about the legislature? Interestingly, the legislature has had relatively few independents or minor
party candidates, in contrast to the influence independents have had in gubernatorial races. In the 2008 elections, eight independent candidates competed for
office, and one was elected.
In a broader sense, though, the fluid, fragmented
voting that marks contests for governor seems also
present in legislative races. Those elections are highly
contested, rather remarkably so. In 2008 every senatorial district had at last two candidates. In the Maine
House, 136 seats, amounting to 90 percent of the
chamber, were contested. (This is a slightly higher rate
of competition than is true nationally for U.S. House
districts.) Moreover, many of those campaigns are hard
fought. In 40 percent of the races for seats in the state
senate in 2008, the winner obtained no more than
about 55 percent of the vote. All this takes place even
though term limits restrict legislators to four consecutive terms in one chamber. But Maine voters are not
willing to wait until the incumbent legislator is termed
out. Choices are offered in each election in nearly all
districts. Additionally, party turnover in legislative
districts is fairly common. In the two election cycles
following the 2004 election, about one-third of the
House districts switched parties, that is, they elected
a member of the other party in 2006 or 2008.
The upshot is that state politics in Maine is
unusually dynamic, with parties that are loosely hung
together, with governors who win by pluralities, not
majorities, with legislatures that are marked by much
turnover among members and significant turnover
among the parties in individual districts. All of this
facilitates a certain degree of bipartisanship, of coalition-building on major legislation. Party lines are surely
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visible in Augusta. Since 1991, however, when a
partisan gridlock in that year caused the state government to grind to a halt for three weeks—leaving Maine
without a state budget and fueling a successful drive for
legislative term limits—we have generally been able to
work around party divisions.
If we step back in time, this pattern seems somewhat to resemble the way parties in the U.S. Congress
operated about 50 years ago. At that time, each of the
two congressional parties was really a mosaic of 50 state
parties. Each state party had its own policy preferences
and political styles, and the members of Congress from
each state reflected those nuances. Cross-party coalitions in the U.S. Congress were fairly common. Indeed
they were often essential for the enactment of major
bills. Such national measures as civil rights bills in the
1950s and 1960s, and revenue sharing and the first
environmental measures in the 1970s, were products
of congressional coalitions, not party-line votes.
What has happened since that time is that the
two parties have shifted from being primarily statebased organizations—which they were for most of
our history—to ones much more centralized in
Washington. We now have national parties. National
party committees and congressional campaign
committees play pivotal roles in fundraising for
congressional races; national interest groups occupy
a more critical place in congressional campaigns. Most
important, in many states once powerful local parties
have eroded, and have little independent impact on
congressional elections. All this has led the parties
in Congress to have greater unity—and to be more
polarized along ideological lines—than in the past.
Maine has experienced less of that trend. Our parties
largely remain tied closely to Maine’s political culture,
with its emphasis on the personal qualifications of
candidates and general resistance to outside pressures
and money in the conduct of state campaigns. The
state seems to stand out because—while the national
policymaking process has changed markedly from a
half century ago—Maine politics has largely retained
its basic characteristics.
So how does this special political process of ours
play out in Washington? The state’s greatest impact is,
of course, found in the Congress. In some respects,
our congressional delegation does not at all reflect the
30 · Maine Policy Review · Winter/Spring 2010

changeable and unpredictable politics just described.
First of all, the Maine delegation is composed, as in the
past, of politicians who run and win on political party
labels. Independent candidates play at most a minor
role in congressional campaigns. Second, Maine
members of Congress tend to serve for long periods of
time. The state has not defeated an incumbent U.S.
senator since 1978 and has defeated only two House
members running for reelection in the past 35 years: in
1974 and 1996. It is almost as if Mainers say that while
we can afford to be unpredictable and even chaotic in
campaigns for choosing state officials—when it comes
to Washington we need politically to dress a little more
formally, to emphasize the importance of experience in
working on the national stage. It is common for
observers to categorize Maine, in ideological terms, as
politically moderate. It is true that we usually operate
in the middle of the political spectrum. However, a
better description may be that our political leaders are
non-ideological. They find themselves in the center, not
out of a desire to seek political balance, but primarily
from a concern with finding practical solutions to difficult problems. That is true throughout our system, I
would argue, whether we are speaking of local officials,
state legislators, or United States senators.
Turning to the executive branch, we confront the
curious problem of Maine’s ability or—perhaps more
accurately said—inability to be an accurate predictor
of presidential elections. Maine won a reputation for
being a reliable state in that regard early in our national
history, specifically, in the election of 1840. The state
voted in September in those years, and in that year
Maine supported the Whig ticket in the state election,
defying the general expectation that 1840 would be
a Democratic year. In November, Whig candidate
William Henry Harrison won the presidency and
Maine’s reputation was established, or seemed so
(Robinson 1932). Consistently Republican after the
Civil War, Maine’s voting habits usually corresponded
with those of the nation until the beginning of the
New Deal, when our record headed downhill. After
rejecting Franklin Roosevelt in four presidential
elections, we managed in most subsequent close elections to wind up on the losing side—favoring Tom
Dewey in 1948, Richard Nixon in 1960, Hubert
Humphrey in 1968, Jerry Ford in 1976, Al Gore in
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2000 and John Kerry in 2004—the only state with
such a low batting average. We should have stopped
with William Henry Harrison.
Despite that record, and our limited experience in
offering presidential candidates, presidents have looked
to Maine for help in their administrations. That is especially true when they have sought individuals who can
work on a bipartisan basis. Examples are former Senator
Bill Cohen’s service as Secretary of Defense in the
Clinton administration, former Senator George
Mitchell’s current appointment as Middle East envoy
and former governors John Reed and Kenneth Curtis as
U.S. ambassadors to Canada and Sri Lanka, respectively.
In looking at Maine politics in Washington we
need also to consider the relationship between the
Maine Supreme Judicial Court and the U.S. Supreme
Court. For many years the nation’s highest court did
not hand down a full opinion concerning any case that
had gone through our courts. Since 1980, however,
the high court has settled nine cases from the Maine
Supreme Judicial Court. Three concerned civil liberty
issues that involved the U.S. Constitution’s Bill of
Rights. The others dealt with the interpretation of
federal laws affecting activities in Maine. Among the
cases that tested the meaning of federal rules were Fort
Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne (7107 U.S. 2211
[1987]), which involved the federal Employment
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 and Alden v.
Maine (8119 U.S. 2240 [1999]), which asked whether
the 11th Amendment to the Constitution prohibited
state employees from using a state court to sue the state
government over the application of the federal Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938 concerning employee
wages. Both cases were extremely controversial. The
U.S. Supreme Court—in a vote of five to four—
affirmed, in each case, the decision of the Maine
Supreme Judicial Court.
There is impressive evidence that Maine’s top
court may be evolving as a leader among state supreme
courts. Most of the nine cases successfully appealed to
the U.S. Supreme Court did not involve specifically
Maine issues. Because they concerned the interpretation of federal laws or federal constitutional provisions,
they could have come from any state. A large portion
of the cases the U.S. Supreme Court reviews from
state courts involves some form of state resistance to

federal law or policy. Accordingly, the high Court
reverses the outcome in about two-thirds of the state
court decisions it considers. That appears not to be
happening in Maine. In the nine cases reviewed since
1980, Maine was upheld in five of them. Those cases
generally concerned national issues, not state questions. Maine happened to be the locale where the
issues were joined. When the U.S Supreme Court
affirmed the state’s rulings, the effect was to translate
the conclusions of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court
into national policy.

[Maine’s political leaders] find themselves
in the center, not out of a desire to seek
political balance, but primarily from a
concern with finding practical solutions
to difficult problems.
Finally, I would like to look at how our political
culture and politics shape the making of policy in our
state and local governments. At the outset, a word needs
to be said about the federal system. I refer especially
to the changes that have taken place in federal-state
relations in the past few decades. Until about the mid1970s, federal-state relations were often described with
the phrase “cooperative federalism.” The federal government provided grants-in-aid to the states, enabling
them carry out a broad array of policies. A good
example was highway building. The state worked under
national guidelines, but had some discretion in deciding
on specific activities. The two political parties differed
over the amount of control the federal government
should have over the states. In presidential campaigns,
intense debates took place over “the proper role of the
federal government.” Democrats generally favored
expansive national power. In contrast, Republicans
urged that certain programs be lodged with the states
with minimal federal interference.
Those debates no longer occur. In 2008, for
instance, there was almost no discussion of federalism
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issues. The main reason is that both parties now largely
agree on the federal government’s place in setting the
national policy agenda. A leading illustration was the
administration of George Bush. A conservative
Republican, President Bush pressed for a national social
and economic agenda that paid little attention to the
states. That posture differed sharply from the one
embraced by Republican presidents Dwight Eisenhower
in the 1950s and Richard Nixon in the early 1970s.
One of the most important defenders of the states in
those years was the business community, which
preferred state regulation over national regulation.
Currently, however, big business tends to side with the
federal government, not the states, in the writing of
regulations. Its allies in the Republican Party do so also.
The same forces that have led to stronger national
parties have also tilted the balance of federalism toward
the national government in designing public policy.1

We have been a policy innovator.…
when major shifts in policy were
needed, the state has come together
to carve out a new direction.
In place of cooperative federalism, the present
arrangement is sometimes styled “coercive federalism.”
Its main components are federal mandates and federal
statutes that affect most areas in which the states work.
Language equipping the federal government to enter
into the activities of state government is found in most
national domestic policies. For instance, in the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (the
stimulus bill), there is a provision stipulating that if a
governor refuses to accept stimulus funds, the state
legislature may do so anyway, despite the governor’s
preference. In doing so, the Act overrides, in some
states, established norms and constitutional rules.
How do the states operate with the federal
government looking on so closely at what they are
doing? A frequent practice is for state officials to seek
adjustments, waivers, and exceptions from federal laws.
32 · Maine Policy Review · Winter/Spring 2010

Our present intergovernmental structure impels
ongoing negotiations between state and federal officials. In that work, a state’s members of Congress often
serve as intermediaries. One example involves truck
weights on Maine’s interstate highway system. Years
ago, Maine and all other states could on their own set
the maximum weight of truck cargoes passing through
their jurisdictions. In the 1990s, however, Congress
entered that field. It established a national standard of
80,000 pounds as the maximum allowable weight on
interstate highways supported by the federal gas tax.
It enforced its rule by using a device called crossover
sanctions. Congress said states not in compliance
would lose a portion of their share of the federal gas
tax. However, if the weight limit hurts a particular
state’s economy, its congressional delegation may try
to insert an exception into the legislation Congress
periodically enacts to transfer money to states from
the federal highway trust fund. When truck limits
were first enacted, trucks passing into Maine were
allowed to carry as much as 100,000 pounds on the
turnpike from Kittery to Augusta. However, the exception applied to that stretch of road only. After many
years of effort, our congressional delegation was able
to extend the exception to the other 300 miles of
Maine roads that are part of the interstate highway
system under a one-year pilot program Congress
enacted in December 2009.
The federal government’s intrusion into state
affairs in no way diminishes the states as the workhorses of U.S. domestic policy. Most domestic policies
are implemented through state bureaucracies. The
federal presence would be more overwhelming without
the participation of the states, which currently raise and
spend more than half a trillion dollars on their own.
Compared to the federal government, all states share,
in varying degrees, one important advantage: they
govern smaller populations, and those populations are
generally more homogeneous than the nation as a
whole. The federal government’s policy gridlock on key
issues is in part a consequence of its much greater
complexity and the multiplicity of decision-making
points. In contrast, the states can sometimes move
rather swiftly and coherently in addressing public problems. It was to this quality that U.S. Supreme Court
Justice Louis Brandeis referred when he stated in New
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State Ice Co. v. Liebmann (52 U.S. 271 [1932]):
“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system
that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose,
serve as a laboratory and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”
Maine’s civic engagement has followed Justice
Brandeis’s hope. We have been a policy innovator.
Importantly, when major shifts in policy were needed,
the state has come together to carve out a new direction. In 1957 the state enacted the Sinclair Act, which
revolutionized Maine’s schools. Consolidating what had
been hundreds of small school districts, the Act created
school administrative districts large enough to ensure
that students desiring to go to college would have
curricula broad enough to provide sufficient courses
toward that goal. Many of our environmental statutes
date to a rather compressed time period, the years from
1969 to 1971. The pulp and paper industry—a huge
conservative force in state politics—recognized that
broad support existed for change in environmental
regulation and did not seriously contest the measures.
In 1969, faced with the need for new revenues for the
surging number of students entering Maine’s higher
education system, the legislature enacted a state income
tax with bipartisan support. Earlier in this decade,
Governor Baldacci set the state on a new course to
provide health care for our citizens and won support
for that program in the first year of his administration.
In addition to generating widespread support,
those shifts reveal two other important characteristics
about Maine’s public policy. One is comprehensiveness.
We generally try to bring as many citizens as possible
under the tent of a particular program or policy. In
designing new programs, we urgently seek to ensure
that policies do not have a “silo” effect of including
some people and excluding others. New programs—
whether ones dealing with economic development, the
environment, social services, or other issues—endeavor
to reach into every nook and cranny of the state. We
do not like to trade in one program so that another can
go forward. A leading example is seen in environmental
policies. Mainers consistently reject the notion that
jobs can or should be created at the expense of
protecting the state’s natural environment.
A second characteristic of our policymaking is
the rapid growth in the professionalization of our

government workforce. Recall that the moralistic or
participatory political culture stresses citizen involvement in government. Citizens not only participate in
electing officials; they often have served as the officials,
especially in local governments. But the demands of
more complex policies require technical expertise, that
is, people trained specifically for certain posts and paid
accordingly. In recent years, the increase in professional
employees has been especially apparent among Maine’s
local governments. That is in large part the case because
we have so many local governments. The number of
full-time salaried employees in our municipalities per
10,000 population has more than doubled since 1960.
Maine has been one of the fastest growing states in the
country in adding such workers, as positions once held
by citizen volunteers and part-time employees now
become full-time, paid professional posts.
These last two features of Maine’s policymaking
activities—comprehensiveness in approach and a
growing political class—have an important quality in
common: they both cost a lot of money. Our state’s
expanded governmental sector is illustrated in a statistic
concerning the state’s gross domestic product (GDP),
the value of all products and services in the state. The
portion that Maine’s governmental expenditures constitutes of its GDP moved from about eight percent in
1960 to about 13 percent in 2000. The rise has helped
fuel in the last few years the numerous referendum
issues that have addressed, in particular, local government finances and local governmental structure.
We may end by asking: How well will Maine
resolve the tensions inherent in its policy style and in its
governing arrangements? Can it reach solutions without
damaging its special and admired political culture? We
do not know the answers to these puzzles. Two factors,
however, give us some confidence about the future.
One is our practical, moderate-oriented political style,
one that insists that finding acceptable solutions to
problems should trump adherence to ideology. The
second advantage is that we are willing to experiment,
to improvise, to innovate, and to find particular—even
unusual—solutions to public problems that no one else
may have thought of, but which seem to work for our
citizens. That, indeed, is Maine’s tradition. I believe it
will continue to be our strength. -
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